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Dual Regulation, 
Collaborative Management, 
or Layered Federalism 
Can Cooperative Federalism 
Models from Other Laws 
Save Our Public Lands? 
Hope M. Ba6cock0 
Few would assert that the current governance model for 
managing the nation's public lands.' which grants exclusive 
authority to the federal government, has protected the nat-
ural resource values of those lands or provided a framework 
for the harmonious resolution of conflicts over their use.2 
Dissatisfaction is apparent from recurrent proposals to pri-
vatize public lands3 or to devolve therr ownership to the 
states.4 The emergence of the "wise use" and "county 
supremacy" movements directly challenges the authority of 
the federal government to manage its land.5 While this new 
state and local assertiveness is not without historical basis 
nor completely without merit,o its proponents have yet to 
G Professor Babcock as an Assooate Professor of Law at Georgetown 
Unwersity Law Center. ThiS article IS an outero;oJth of the authofs presenta-
tion at the Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado 
School of Law conference, Cfsllengtng Federal o-:mershlp and Management: 
Public Lands and Public Benefits (Oct. 11-13. 1995). and on testimony she 
eave before the U.S. Senate Enerev and Natural Resources Subcommittee on 
Forests and Public Lands Manaeement, on No¥ember 2, 1995. The author 
would like to thank Peter B;,me. Vicki !ackson. Rlch3rd Lazarus. and Doug 
Parker for thelr lnslehtful comments on eJrlier drafts of this article, and 
Barbara Rich, the author"s research assistant. for her ur:aluab!e assiStance 
and attention to detail an preparing thiS article for publication. 
I. The meaning of the term "public lands· has varied ereatly. While the 
term Is most frequently used to mean all land O>':ned by the United States. 
at vanous pomts In time. the phrase has been sj'nonymous with the term 
•public domain lands; the pro¥enance and meanmg of wh1ch is also a mat-
ter of some confusion and amb1gu1ty. This article uses the terrras public 
lands and public domain lands lnterch3ngeably to refer only to the land;; 
managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). See GEOP.GE C. 
Coc;<;Jr;s, Punuc NA!tlr.AL REsou;;crs Lo:.v § 1.102(11 ( 19i0) for further explica-
tion of the meaning of these and other comparable terrras. 
2. The Western hJStonan Patnaa Umend: refers to thas conflict as an 
"infimtely sustamable boxmg match.• Patnda l.Jmenck. A Hfstory cf tlie Pu5li~ 
Lands DtcJte, Natural Resources Law Center of the Unwersity of Colorado 
School of Law conference, Challenging Federal Ownership and 
Management: Public Lands and Public Benefits (Oct. 11-13. 1995)(paper m 
the possession of the author). 
3. James 1... Huffman. Puf!I; LanJs Mar:Jg!mmlln an Agt cf DmgrJlatian and 
Pnralizalian. 10 Pus. IJ::o L. RE.v. 29 (1939) (ur~::~ng abandonment of pre-
sumption favonng public management In favor of examination of Institu-
tional alternatives. such as prwate control). But su Joseph L. Sax. Tlie 
ugitlmacy cf OJ!latil'l Valu!$ in IF:t CJ!t cf PuE!I: Lad;, 56 U. CoLO. L. RE.v. 537 
I 1985) (prefernng collectiVe values to atomistic mdw1dual ones). 
4. For a comment highly aitical of delee:lting to states a role m manag-
ing national natural resources such as Yellowstone National Park. see Rich3rd 
Schneebeck. Comment. Slate P.utitlfJ!lJn In Fed!ral PC~'!/ Ma&.g (ar IF.! Yefb,;stanz 
Ew-systcm: A Meaningful S:lutbn cr BrJ:Str.lSS as UsUJJ?. 21 IJ:;o & WJJER L. P.E'I. 391 
(1936) (explammg that senous defidenaes m state leelS!ation.limited state 
jurasdlctlon and nationalmterests requ~re retamed federal control). 
5. The w1se use and county supremacy movements are well-orgamzed 
efforts In the West opposmg maeased enmonmental protection on federal 
lands and the acqUISition by the federal go¥emment of more public land;; 
for preservation purposes. Su Anita P. Miller. Allis Nat Ou!!t on IF.! Western 
Front: Tf:e B:11tl! /Jr Pu6!!c Lands. 25 URB. J..\7/. 827 (1993) (describtng and ana-
lyztne legal basis of wise use, county supremacy mo¥ements); Rene Erm 11. 
Tf:e 'Wise Ust' Mm·lmtnl; Tf.z OJrulilulbnality c/ Lual A!tbn an Ftderal Lands Und!r 
tf:e Pmmpi1Jn Dc;lnnt, 30 IDAHO L. RE.v. 631 (1993-94) (concluding that coun-
ty land use plans requiring federal agenaeslo mdude county eovemments 
m their management and planning processes are a valid constitutional 
response to preser:ationtst poliaes). 
6. Sally K. Fanfax et al.. Fdualism and tf.z WiU and s,ml! Rim$ A!t: Ni7.u 
You Su II, Ni7c You Dan't, 59 WASH. L. REv. 417 (1934); Ricfsrd H. Co·::art & 
Sally K. Fa1rfax, Puflic Lands Federalism: J!d!riJJ Tf.tcry and Mminatrali~z Reality, 
15 ECOI.OCV L.O. 375 (1988). 
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i Hope M. BOOcock offer a workable solution other than complete ouster of the federal sovere1gn.7 Emergmg theorems m conservation biology and 
ecology which are changmg our v1ew of the natural 
landscape, are placmg additional strams on the cur-
rent model. What once was a highly localized deCI-
sion about how a specific p1ece of land withm a fixed 
geo-political boundary should be managed, has 
gamed regional (even global) 1mplications.8 
Ecologists are convmcmgly demonstrating that effec-
tive natural resource management Implicates more 
than one govermng authority m the management 
task, requmng consultation and coordination among 
political)unsdictions.9 
Ecologists and conservation biologists are also 
teachmg us that chaos and diversity are more appropn-
ate biological goals than equilibnum and single specie 
restoration.1o The contemporary ecological paradigm 
recogniZes that natural systems are open and not nec-
essarily m equilibnum and that the focus of the para-
digm should be on process or the "traJectory of change," 
rather than on the final endpomt.'1 If, as conservation 
biologists contend, a landscape 1s composed of a 
mosa1c of patches, each shifting m composition over 
time, then deciSions about the management of these 
systems must mclude the capacity to adapt to new 
7. C/. BERNARD SHANKS, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND (1984) (argu· 
ing for retention of federal ownership). 
8. Judy L. Meyer, Tlit Dance of Nalure: New ConctpiS rn Ecology, 
69 CHl.·KENT L. REV. 875 (1994)1 
9. Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and tlie Emergrng Conctpt of Ecosystem 
Management on tlit Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43 (1990): 
Reed F. Ness, Some Pnne~ples of Conservalfon Biology, as Tliey Applylo 
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.·KENT L. REV. 893,907 (1994) (expla1mng 
that ecosystem management requiTes cooperation among agen· 
c1es and landowners and coordination of mventory, research, 
monitonng, and management activities). 
10. Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, Tlie ln/Cuence of 
Ecological Science on American Law: All lnlroduction, 69 CHI.·KENT L. 
REV. 847, 869-71 (1994) (stating that resource management has 
become a grand and ·nsky" expenment. m which human change 
IS viewed as JUSt one more •flux"). 
II. Meyer, supra note 8, at 877. 
12. Meyer, supra note 8, at 881-82. See also Professor William 
Rodgers who contends that conservation b10logy has undermmed 
the present legal superstructure, because that structure 1s based 
on a preference for static legal conservation techmques like acqui-
sition of fee simple absolute title to land, removal of resident 
human populations from condemned lands, parcel-by-parcel eva!· 
uations, and what he labels an ·ark" configuration (management 
of spec1es by ISOlation withm Impermeable boundanes). William 
H. Rodgers, Jr .• Adaption of EnvlTonrnenlal Law to tlie EcologiSis' Discovery 
of Disequilibna, 69 CHl.·KENT L. REV. 875, 887(1994). 
13. The need to create mstitutional and process harmony m 
the management of these natural systems IS illustrated by the 
rap1d development of pnvate and state-owned lands surrounding 
our national parks. Th1s development IS decreasmg the cushiOn-
Ing effect those lands once had for the public resources, eroding 
the federal land manage(s ability to protect the federal portion of 
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mformation and unanticipated systemic changes.l2 
To realize the goals of conservation b1ology and 
ecosystem management, the mstitutions that govern 
these systems must be able to work together harmo-
mously, across political boundary lines and Into a 
biologically uncertam future.'; The ng1dity of the cur· 
rent public lands model creates substantial barriers 
to the achievement of these goals.14 
The era of special mterest dommance of public 
Jands policy may be over as welL The cattle and tim· 
ber barons and hard rock mmers who have ruled the 
public lands under a battery of nmeteenth-century 
laws and policies, Charles Wilkmson's "lords of yes· 
terday,"15 are.g1vmg way to multiple public lands 
"communities."l6 The West 1s now a vanegated land· 
scape of divers communities loosely bound togeth· 
er m a patchwork of shared interests, occupations, 
and geographic locations, not by a smgle philoso· 
phy of commodity extractionP Governance mstltu· 
t1ons and procedures designed to accommodate 
btpolar conflicts among powerful special mterests 
over the consumption of natural resources are ill· 
suited for conflicts m th1s new polycentnc world. IS 
Th1s article's workmg premise IS that unless the 
current governance structure for the management of 
public lands changes, the political conflicts over their 
transboundary ecosystems. Robert B. Kelter, Ta~lng Account of the 
Ecosystem on tlie Public Dorna1n: Law and Ecolog!l In lhe arealer 
Yellowstone RegiOn, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 923 (1989). 
14.Joseph L. Sax. Nature and Habilal Conservation and Protection 
rnlhe United Slales, 20 EcoLOGY L.O. 47(1993) (criticizing what he 
labels the histone ·enclave strategy·• approach to public lands 
management). 
15. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIA!l: LANll, 
WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 17 ( 1992). 
16. Sarah F. Bates. Public Lands Cornrnunltles: ln Search of a 
Community of Values, 14 Pus. LAND L. REV. 81 ( 1993). For an even ear· 
lier exposition of the Ideas contained in Bates' article, see Joseph 
L. Sax, Do Communities Have Righls?: The National Parks as a Laborator!l 
of New Ideas, 45 U. Pm. L. REV. 499 (1984). 
17. For example, Raymond Rasker reports that the Rocky 
Mountam West has added over 2 million new lobs from 1969 to 
1991. most of which were m ·service-related" occupations. Again, 
according to Rasker, m 1969, over II% of all direct employment 
and 9.6% of personal mcome in the region were In natural 
resource mdustnes (mmmg, farmmg, ranching or lumber); by 
1991. these combmed mdustnes represented less than 6% of all 
employment and less than 5% of all personal income, while the 
semce mdustnes, m 1991. represented over 81% of employment 
and 68% of labor mcome. Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old 
Vistas: Tnt Economrc Role of EnVJronmtnlal Oualit!l 111 Wtsltrn Public 
Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 369, 377 (1994). See also SARAH F. BATES ET 
AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND REDISCOVERY IN 
WESTERN WATER Poucv (19931: Cowart & Fairfax. supra note 6; 
Bates, supra note 16. For an even earlier exposition of the ideas 
contamed m Bates' article, see Sax, supra note 16. 
18. Conservation biology's "adaptive management" 
approach with its emphasis on diversity and flux may offer a use· 
ful pnsm through wh1ch to v1ew these new public land communi· 
ties as well. 
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use and management will continue to blight the1r 
future. just as it has marred the1r past '9 Further, fail-
mg to adapt the management of public lands to our 
changmg perceptions about the nature and needs of 
the biologtcal and soc1al communities that depend 
upon them will only engender a new generation of 
conflicts and further dim1msh the vitality of those 
communities.zo Nowhere are these conflicts more 
mtense and the nsks and consequences of failure 
htgher than on the "public domam" lands; those 
lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) under the authority of the Federal Land Policy 
& Management Act (FLPMA).21 
The purpose of thts art1cle ts to determme 
whether there are alternatives models of federalism, 
whtch m1ght Improve the management of public 
domam lands.22 None of the models discussed 
19. The article assumes that the present public lands man-
agement model1s too broken to be fiXed with mmor changes to 
exJsting public lands laws and mstitutions, and that the current 
paradigm cannot be saved. Therefore, the models discussed in 
th1s Article are presumed to be substitutes fQr, not amendments 
or supplements to. that model. 
20. According to Rasker, community stability can best be 
assured by economic diversity. Rasker, supra note 17, at 391. 
Rasker goes on to make the pomt that the cornerstone of an eco-
nomic diversity strategy IS the creation of a favorable business 
climate and the protection of the cultural, sooal, and environ-
mental qualities that make a community a pleasant place in 
wh1ch to live and do busmess. id. 
21.43 u.s.c. § 1701-84 (1994). 
22. Th1s article looks at "federalism" as an organizing prina· 
pie ofAmencan government, as a theory of institutions, m which 
what 1s most Important 1s the allocation of power between feder· 
al and state governments. Phrases used m this Article, like "fed· 
eralism structure" or "federalism model" refer to the apportion· 
ment of day-to-day management authority over public domain 
lands between the federal and state governments. The focus of 
th1s Article 1s on the very practical problems that that apportion· 
ment must solve. Less doctnnai and more theoretical questions 
about "pnnapled" notions of federalism. denved from the constl· 
tutional debates over our federal structure of government or from 
more modem prudential concerns, and the1r application to the 
allocation of power on the nation's public lands. while beyond 
the scope of th1s Article, are currently under exammatlon by the 
author. For a more m depth exposition of th1s distinction, see H. 
Jefferson Powell, Tf.e Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 633 ( 1993). For a closer look at the complexity of how power 
1s distributed between the political mstitutions of state and fed-
eral governments m the latter part of the twentieth century, see 
Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 41 VANo. L. REV. 1485 ( 1994). 
23. TheArtic:le does not address the question of who should 
own the public lands. Therefore, 1ssues of State or county devo-
lution and pnvatization are not discussed. nor IS the validity of 
the normative goals set out m the public lands laws. smce none 
of the models reqmres the1r change. 
24. Professor A Dan Tariock sets forth many of these ratio-
nales m h1s article. A. Dan Tarloc:k. Nalional Po1m; State Resource 
Sovere1gnty and Federalism m tne 1980s: Scaling Amenca's Magic 
Mountam, 32 KAN. L. REV. 111,-121-22 (1983). A more refined look 
at the question than IS offered here mtght also examine the pur-
pose for wh1ch the land IS bemg managed and the conmc:ts that 
m1ght anse from that management, the strength of the federal 
here, however, proposes complete recision of feder-
al authority over public lands; rather they offer an 
enhanced role for states in the federal decisionmak-
mg process.23 A continuing federal presence is 
assumed to be necessary to prevent inter-state dis-
tributional inequities from arising or economic dis-
cnmination from occumng. Only the federal gov-
ernment can correct market failures when they 
occur and uniformly protect national norms, such 
as our natural heritage.24 And even if the Western 
states are becoming more supportive of these 
norms as some assert,2s senous questions would 
remam about the ability of those states to take on 
sole responsibility for management of these lands 
without an infusion of new funds.26 
The article examines three models of gover-
nance ("dual regulation," "collaborative manage-
Interest In the particular land or resource bemg managed. the 
Impact of the deas1on on Ictal Interests. the extent of parity 
between the competing JuriSdictional mterests. and the me-
versibility of the consequences. 
25. Some find thiS a dubious assumption and question 
whether an enhanced state role on public lands can be consiStent 
with enVIronmental protection. Su, t-1J,, &-Jmeebed:. supra note 4. 
Bul cf, Cowart & Faldax. supra note 6; leffreJ' L. Be-;le.A Compi!nsan cf 
tf:t Fdual ConslsltnCIJ D:<lnr.z Udtr FLPMAan.i tr:z CZMA. 9 VA. ErmL. 
L.). 207,217 (1989). The courts ha>e found nosudt in::onsJStency. 
supporting what mteht be called a ·reJtr<enated federalism"-an 
enhanced state role In the admlmstration of errmonmental pro-
grams. m general. and on public Jan:ls.m partic:u!ar.Iohn D, Leshy. 
Granite Rock and tF.z S!.llis' lr.!lumtt O;<r Fd:ral Lan1 Use, 18 Er<:rt .. L. 
99 (1987); NewYorkv, United States. 505 US. 144 (1992): Califomza 
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rotk Co,. 48!) US, 572 (1987), 
A strong theoretical amument can also be made that states 
should play some ro!e m mamt:ement of these lands. These argu-
ments are based on the reco(:lltzed ro!e st.ates p!ay m our federal 
S}"Stem of go>emment Core federalism values commonly ass<:oat-
ed with the states mdude preservation of hbertj•, cmc partiopation 
and d1w~rsity. For further exposition of ths thought an:! its conse-
quences. see TH£ Fmrr..wsr Nos. 10. 45 flames Madison) (Clinton 
Rossitered,, 19611: Richard 8, Stewart. M;~.ii::an·s W;filn'.lU, 57 U. em. 
L. REV 335 (1990) (areutng that the verJ Ca:tions Madison feared at 
the Jocalle-:el, necessitating a strong federal sa-;eretgn, have taken 
over government at the national le-•el); Pcr~;eJJ. supra n!:lte 22. at 
681-88. Su a!ro Ann Althouse. V.tnJ!bns an a TF.tal!f cf Namo.ati1·e 
Fc.:fuilfum: A Suprm.z C:i:ut D:.J!:]'.l!, 42 0!/i:£ L.J. 979 (1993) (conver-
gence on normative pnnop!e that federaliSm IS Important because 
It protects n&hts or dttzenS). 
One could also argue from the vantaze of p:~htical expedi-
ency that malntamtng some me3Sure or state control over man-
agement of these lands will enhance the legitimacy of that man-
agement. and from the \'antage or admtnlstrative effiaency that 
the complexity of land use ISSues of thiS Mture sug~ests that 
effective regulation and enforcement should be erounded m 
knowledge of speaftc Ictal condtttons, S!z James H, Wlclr.ersham. 
Tf:t Quill Rr•du!bn C;;n!/mus; Ti:t Emerging Ne-•• M~d!l[arState Grc-.otn 
Managzmtnt SlatultS, 18 HA.c:v. Eli'.7L. L. REY. 489. 52~30 (1994) 
(applytnfl this reasomng to advotate on behalf of a consiStency 
model for land use p1anmng under whtch Ictal go·;emments 
maintain a stronfl presence subJect to state o>erstght). 
26. Cowart and Fairfax argue that grov;th m the states• 
capadty to manage enVIronmental resources IS a aitical compo-
nent In the push to de-JISe a ne-N scheme or public land maMge-
ment Cowart & Fatdax. supra note 6. 
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i Hope M. Babcock ment" and "layered federalism") found m other areas of environmental law to deterrrune whether their application to public domam lands might 
lessen the federalism tensions mherent m the cur-
rent model and enhance the land manager's ability 
to make decisions that are both ecologically sound 
and reflect the new vo1ces populatmg theses 
lands.27 Ach1evmg rational ecosystem management 
and a more democratic mode of deciSJonmakmg 
may be of greater Importance than attammg non-
fractious governance. Intergovernmental fnction 
may be a necessary, unavoidable, even welcome by-
product of our "compound republic" form of govern-
ment; a transaction costs of a federal structure that 
relies on overlappmg and sometimes conflictmg 
JUrisdictions of governance to safeguard those lib-
erties not protected by the explicit constitutional 
guarantees.2a No such benefit accrues from the 
other two problems.29 
The structure of the article 1s straightforward. 
Part II exammes the current federalism model on 
public domam lands and concludes, despite some 
of its virtues, the model has caused Inter-govern-
mental fnction and created barners to rational 
ecosystem management and community-based par-
ticipation m the declsionmakmg process. Part Ill 
describes and then critiques each of the alternative 
federalism designs agamst the same three critena. 
The article concludes by suggesting wh1ch, if any of 
the models holds the greatest prom1se for resolvmg 
27. There are models wh1ch change the bas1c constitutional 
federalism des1gn (such as m1ght be suggested by English land 
use law), create new governmental entities (public corporations), 
or make use of mterstate agreements (interstate compacts), 
wh1ch m1ght solve some or even all of the problems assoc1ated 
with management of public domam lands. How far our mstitu· 
tions and systems of governance should be restructured m· the 
search for a solution to the public lands' dilemma. however 
worthwhile an mqu1ry, 1s beyond the scope of th1s Article. 
Therefore, while the models exammed here each shifts the bal-
ance of power and realigns the workmg relationships between the 
three levels of government, none restructures that bas1c frame-
work. The author also recogmzes that any acceptable substitute 
paradigm would, m addition, have to av01d unsettling long-held 
public and pnvate expectations, creating unnecessary costs, or 
fostenng distributional mequities. However, such an analys1s of 
the extent to wh1ch each of the models m1ght av01d these 1m pacts 
1s also beyond the scope of th1s Article. 
28. Dave Froynmayer, A New Look at Federalism: Tfte Theory and 
Implications of Dual Sovereignty, 12 ENVTL. L. 903,912 (1982).1ndeed, 
the Federalists enviSIOned that fnction between the central gov-
ernment and the several states m1ght even come to a show of 
force, wh1ch they countenanced because of the Importance of the 
states m protecting the nghts of the people. See, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (states are to ·sound the 
alarm" if the conduct of the national rulers appeared Improper 
and serve not only as the vo1ce but the "Arm" of the people's dis· 
content), and THE FEDERAUST No. 46 (James Madison) (stating that 
opposed to the United States would be ·a militia amounting to 
near half a million citizens with arms m their hands ... fighting for 
196 
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the problems besetting public lands management. 
While the author recogmzes thtthese problems may 
be too complex, diverse and endogenous to the 
public lands expenence or a specific geographic 
area to enable a "smgle SIZe fits all solution," she 
hopes that the analytical exerc1se of exammmg 
these models may ennch the storehouse of ideas 
we draw from m the search for solutions. 
11. The Prevaillng Federalism Or "Dominant 
Federal" Model 
The current governance model on public domain 
lands grants the federal government legal pnmacy or 
dommance over those lands.J0 The salient feature of 
the "dommant federal" model1s that the federal gov-
ernment admm1sters resource management pro· 
grams on public domam lands by itself. There is no 
statutorily mandated management role for the 
states. BLM Issues grazmg permits, mmmg patents, 
oil, gas, coal. and geothermal leases, and offroad 
vehicles permits, not the state land management 
agency. The state has no legal authority to manage 
the natural resources that are the subJect of these 
authonzations, even when the1r management direct-
ly Implicates the state's vital mterests." 
There have been expenments with more 
"cooperative" or reciprocal models of federalism 
on public lands at vanous pomts m our h1story,n 
but none of these has Significantly changed the 
the1r common liberties and united and conducted by govern-
ments possessmg their affections and confidence"). THE 
FEDERAUST (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in Kramer, supra note 
22, at 1515-17. 
29. Th1s article does not disaggregate complaints about the 
management of public lands that reflect only the self-Interests of 
smgle user groups from those who champion a broader public 
cause and max1m1zation of the public's share of the distribution• 
al benefits from these lands. In the author's opinion, the former 
should be entitled to little deference m any discussion about 
managmg public resources, and should not by themselves c<:~use 
any changes m the present federalism model. 
30. For greater mformation about the application of this 
precept to rangeland, see George C. Coggms, The Law of Public 
Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use 
Mandates, 14 ENVTL. L. I (1983). 
31. The ng1dity and absurdity of th1s arrangement Is perhaps 
best illustrated in the case of so-called "checkerboard lands," an 
eponymous pattern of Western land ownership reflective o( the 
h1stonc public lands disposition practices of the nineteenth cen• 
tury, where each JUrisdiction manages its squared subpart of the 
renewable and nonrenewable resource In accordance with its 
management goals and directives. 
32. See, e.g., Bowen Bla1r, Jr., Tlie Columbia River Gorge Nallo"al 
SceniC Area: Tfte Act, lis Genesrs and Legislative His lory, 17 ENVTL L. 863 
(1987); Cowart & Faufax, supra note 6, at 421-39 (discussing a 
vanety of admm1strative techniques that have been utilized by 
state, local and federal resource managers to manage public 
domam resources cooperatively), 
Wmterl996 
balance of power between the federal government 
and the states.33 Laws like the Natrona! 
Envrronmental Policy Act34 and the Endangered 
Specres Act35 require little more than consultation 
with state agencres, grvmg the states no power 
over federal agency decrsrons. FLPMA's "consisten-
cy" provisions36 stop well short of grvmg states and 
local communities a land use plannmg-based veto 
over activities on public domam lands.37 On public 
domam lands, the federal government is, as the 
model's title implies, "dommant." 
While the "dommant federal" model, with its 
unitary soverergn, provrdes some assurances that 
national norms will be met and that distributional 
mequities between regrons will be mmrmrzed, the 
model has caused problems for public lands gov-
ernance. The model's dependence upon central-
33. Cowart & Fa~rfax, supra note 6, at 408 (hlstoncal, ph~'SI· 
cal and fiscal realities have led federal and state governments to 
share de facto management of public lands ). For a more theo-
retical exposition of the same conclusion, see Kramer, supra note 
22 (political parties, structure of admm1strative state, exit rights, 
and cultural commonalities link fortunes of federal and state 
office holders m a reaprocal dependence requmng each to pay 
attention to needs of other). 
34. 42 u.s.c. 99 4321-70d (1994). Ste ld. 9 4332 (preparation 
of environmental 1mpact statements): Cowart & Fairfax. supra 
note 6, at 415 n.211 (discussmg the extent to wh1ch NEPA 
Gu1delines have been mcorporated m BLM planning regula· 
tions). 
35. 16 U.S.C. 99 1531-44 (1994). See id. 9 1536. Ste also !d.§ 
1535 (state cooperative agreements). 
36. FLPMA 9 202(c)(8) requ~res that the Secretary's land use 
plans shall prov1de for compliance· with federal and state pollu-
tion control laws. 43 U.S.C. 9 1712(c)(8) ( 1994). FLPMA 9 202(c)(9) 
Imposes a cons1stency obligation on those plans to •tfie maxi· 
mum extent (the Secretary) finds cons1stent with Federal law and 
the purposes of th1s Act." 43 U.S.C. 9 1712(c)(9) (1994). These 
requirements have been mterpreted by BLM as requiring ·con· 
s1deration· of resource-related plans and polices of state and 
local governments." 43 C.F.R. 9 1610.3-2(e) (1995): Cowart & 
Fa~rfax, supra note 6, at 417. 
37. Leshy, supra note 25. Even Cowart and Fairfax. who dte 
the consistency language m FLPMAas providing a statutory basis 
for more cooperative federal-state-local management of public 
lands, admit that the Importance of these provisions IS ·probably 
more political and symbolic than legal," noting the language 
does not g1ve the states a veto over federal programs or lnltia· 
tives and that the federal land manager has ultimate authority to 
determme whether federal programs are cons1stent with state 
and local pnorities and even to over-nde those pnorities to 
aclueve federal obJectives. Cowart & Fairfax. supra note 6, at 418. 
See also Beyle, supra note 25, at 220-21 (noting that under FLPMA's 
coordination mandate, "(t)here are no structural guarantees that 
VJews of state and local governments or the public will be taken 
mto account" as the Act does not define what IS meant by ·mean· 
mgful public partiapation"). 
38. Miller. supra note 5: Anita P. Miller, Tlie Weslem Fronl 
Revlsiled, 26 URB. LAw. 845 ( 1994 ). For an mteresting perspective on 
the context and h1story of the comparable, earlier Sagebrush 
Rebellion, see Cowart & Fairfax. supra note 6. 
rzed, coercive control over state action is responsi-
ble for much of the tension and frustration fueling 
the "county supremacy" and "wise use" move-
ments.Js By offering only a single target for 
takeover, the model allowed special interests to 
capture federal land management agenciesl9 with 
calamitous results for the natural resource base.4o 
And, by largely excluding states from the manage-
ment exercise, the model has done little to 
encourage states to develop their own natural 
resource management capabilities, perpetuating 
the myth of state inability and unwillingness to 
assume a more active management role over these 
resources.41 
The "dominant federal" model's dependence 
upon political boundary Jines and single-use desig-
nations42 defies \'Jell-accepted precepts of conserva-
39. Wnnr;so:1, supril note 15; Coggins, supra note 30. 
40. While the condition of BU.i raneeland has improved. m 
1991 35% was still classified by the Coundl on Environmental 
Quality as poor or fair. compared to 82% m 1936. Cou:;oz. o:t 
Em11:0!1~.!Er:YAL OlLWlY, E!i'.lF.O!I!.!EriTAL 0UALit'l~ THE: TWElrrl·THIRD 
Allr:UAL REro;rr OF n!E Cou:;cu. 0!1 E!mF:O!I!.!EriTAL O!!.Wt'i, fig. 24b. 
at 346 (1992). For an anai;'Sis of the lmpaa of grazmg on public 
lands, see Myles J, Watts & Jeffre-;T. LaFrance. Cc"•>. Cc-•·6oys. ani 
Ccnlrc\'l/31): Tf.t Granng Ftt lssut, In MUtnl't.E: Co:1rucrs O'JER 
MUt.nfL£ US£, PaurtU\1. Eco:;o.'J'l REs<'.--I.<:CH CErm:R 59 (Terry L 
Anderson ed.. 1994). Su a!ro Huffman, supra note 3, at 49; 
Wnm;so:l, supra note 15: Coggins, supra. note 30. 
41. Fairfax, tl at assert that state errmonmental manage-
ment capabilities (l.t., the political and le~::al authority authonz-
lng states to administer natural resource lav;s, the states· institu-
tional capadty to implement these laws and the availability of a 
rele";ant anformation·base) have impro¥ed as a result of expen-
ence adminlstenng pollution control lav;s and mteracting with 
federal government under multiple-use statutes. Fa1rfax et al .• 
supra note 6. Others argue that the expenence under the multiple-
use statutes has been too limited to giVe states comparable 
expertise in the natural resource management area. Schneebed:.. 
supra note 4 (state legiSlation rarely addresses ISSUes like estab-
lishing pnorities between competing uses of natural resources,JS 
frequently fragmented between different state agenaes and few. 
if any mechamsms for requinne coordination between mterested 
agenaes elUSt at the state le-;el). Melinda Bruce & Teresa PJce. 
Ccnlrdling IF..t Slut Ras~; lssU!S and Tunis In Stale Lan1 Man_jgmrent. 
29 J..A!;o & W~JES L REv. I (1994) (mo:lifications must be made m 
existing state land use management practices for long-term sus-
talnability of the resources on those lands): c. Matson 
Heidelberg, Note, cL-slng If.! Bcai en Sd::al Trust Lands, 45 VA:lD. L 
REv. 158 I ( 1992) (modification of the frame-JJork go•;ermng man-
agement of state scho:~l trust lands is warranted). 
42. Public lands law vartually zones public lands for vanous 
uses. For example, if a mining daim for a hard rock mmeralJS 
filed. the land as dedfcated to hard rock mmeral development 
regardless of other present or future uses it mteht sustam. 30 
U.S.C. §§ 22-39 (1994). Even public domam lands, wh1ch are to 
be managed under a multiple-use sustained ;1eld standard. 
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 
( 1994), which Implies some co-exastence of different uses. are. m 
fact. managed to achh;;e either ranee use values. public recre-
ational values or wilderness values. but not all of these values at 
one time, because the managers lack the tools and the will to rec-
ondle the resulting connicts. Coeg~ns. supra note 30. at 63-65. 
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tion b1ology43 and biOdiversity protection,44 as well 
as notions of "sustamability."45 The model -rests 
upon the not1on that spec1es can be protected m 
perpetuity through management m Isolated pre-
serves, even though the preserve's boundanes are 
permeable, its conditions and res1dents always m 
flux.46 The model's reliance upon a commodity sta-
bility strategy, wh1ch emphasiZes commodity extrac-
tion as the sole mterest of public lands communi-
ties, conflicts with and threatens the emergmg 
amenity-based foundation of the new western econ-
omy.47 Reg1onal demographic changes4B underlymg 
th1s new economy are also undermmmg the model's 
legal systems and mstitutions that cater to com-
modity extraction mterests.49 
The process by wh1ch deciSions are made about 
the management and allocation of public resources 
on public lands has remamed largely closed to 
broad-based cit1zen participatiOn and heavily 
we1ghted toward spec1al mterests with the1r greater 
43. Ness, supra note 9 (conservation biOlogy's adaptive man-
agement practices are at odds with recogmzing law's need for 
boundary certamty). 
44. Biodiversity protection also reqmres site-specific, 
decentralized decJSJonmakmg. However. devolution of these 
functions to local government offers the potential of even greater 
habitat fragmentation and more mtense controversies about 
prospective land use. Local governments additionally lack the 
regulatory authority and revenue to do the 10b. A. Dan Tarlock, 
Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: Wflat Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 555 (1993). 
45. For further discussiOn of the effect of notions of sus-
tamability on the management of public lands, see Robert B. 
Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Lme: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem 
Management, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293 (1994): Keiter, supra note 13: 
J.B. Ruhl. Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of 
Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely 
Different, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555 ( 1995): GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
PUB. No. GAO/RCED-94-111, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING APPROACH ( 1994 ). 
46. Rodgers, supra note 12, at 890 (stating that natural sys-
tems resist law-sanctioned boundanes between 1unsdictions, 
between pnvate and public property holders, and between his· 
toncally sanctioned entitlements and future needs). 
47. Rasker, supra note 17, at 397. According to Bates, the 
National Forest Service's commodity stability policy wh1ch 
emphasizes commodity extraction as the sole mterest of public 
lands communities, Ignores the multiplicity and diversity of these 
communities. See Bates, supra note 16. 
48. Such changes mclude mcreasmg urbamzation, the grow-
Ing political power of recreatiomsts and preservatiomsts, and the 
appearance of multiple public lands communities. Rasker writes 
about the "footloose techno-yuppies with portable computers· or 
·modem cowboys." who have made pollaes of multiple-use sus-
tained·yJeld begm to lose the1r meamng." Rasker, supra note 17, at 
396. Cowart and Fairfax note that these changes are also provJd· 
lng an Impetus for states to affect greater mterest m mcreasmg 
state fiscal and environmental controls over public lands 
resources. See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 6. 
49. Wilkmson also describes at great length the extent to 
which the legal system, upon wh1ch the dommant federal model 
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resources. The formalism of th1s process, together 
with its b1polar and essentially adversanal struc· 
ture,50 Imposes multiple barners to participation by 
mchoate, diversified communities. The common 
practice of land managers under the "dommant fed· 
era!" model to record the vo1ces from these diverse 
communities as "little more than chits on a tally 
sheet"51 1s contributing to the cns1s m public confi· 
dence m the ability of the federal government to 
manage public domam lands.52 
The "dommant federal" model causes signlfi· 
cant tens1ons on the nation's public lands. The 
model also presents substantial barners to rational 
ecosystem management and enhanced community· 
based mvolvement m the dec1s1onmakmg process 
affecting these lands. These problems undermine 
the model's positive features, namely the theoreti· 
cal prospect that its application will ach1eve nation· 
al norms and prevent mter-state distributional 
mequities. But, do models proposmg a more coop· 
Js based, has sustamed a set of practices and policies that have 
hJstoncally favored large, smgle mterests which are now a~.yn• 
chronous with modern values. See WILKINSON, supra note 15. 
50. Marcus E. Ethndge comments that the administrative 
process, with its procedures designed under the influence of legal 
values and doctnnes, IS clearly "better suited to producing effec• 
tive adversanal arrangements with appropriate protection of prl• 
vate nghts than to creating avenues for public involvement In 
policy making." Marcus E. Ethndge, Procedures for Citlun Involvement 
m Envlfonmental Policy: An Assessment of Policy Effects. In CITIZEN 
PARTICIPAnON IN PUBUC DECISION MAKING 115, 128-29 (Jack DeSarlo 
& Stuart Langton eds., 1987). 
51. Rasker, supra note 17, at 393 (quoting Sarah F. Bates, 
Discussion Paper: Tfle Changmg Management Philosophies of the Public 
Lands, m W. LANDS REP. No. 3 (1993)). Rasker goes on to point out 
that th1s "head-counting· approach to conflict resolution actual· 
ly foments polanzation and conflict, and according to Wilkinson, 
Js exploited by the federal land management agencies so that 
they can be seen as a "compromising, reasonable, middle of the 
road entity." !d. (quoting Charles F. Wilkmson, Toward an Ethic c/ 
Place, 1H BEYOND THE MYTHIC WEST 71, 74 ( 1990)). 
52. Both Rasker and Flournoy write about the need for nat· 
ural resource managers to adopt different analytical techniques 
to account for the ever·mcreasmg complexity of our relationship 
to the natural environment; techmques, which are predicated 
upon the existence of many different public lands communities 
and are responsive to theu needs. Rasker believes that the mar· 
ket-based approach merits senous attention as an additional 
management tool to be applied selectively as a supplement to 
the scientific and public participation models of management 
Rasker, supra note 17, at 393-96. While Flournoy favors the "mul· 
tiple alternative-multiple attribute analysis developed by a work• 
mg group convened by the federal government for the systemat· 
Jc Identification and assessment of the values affected by wet· 
lands alterations. Alyson C. Flournoy, Copmg wllft Complexll!/. 27 
LoY. LA. L. REV. 809, 817-19 (1994). One of the advantages, 
Flournoy notes m the multiple alternative-multiple attribute 
model1s that it provides not only decJslonmakers, but members 
of the public with a clear VIew of the policy choices to be made, 
making regulatory decisions more accessible to the publlc and 
therefore, more democratic, wh1ch, in turn, may increase publlc 
acceptance of regulatory deciSions. Jd. at 823. 
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erative mode of governance offer any better 
prospect? 
III. Alternative Models of Cooperative Federalism 
The article examines three "cooperative federal-
Ism" models found m other areas of environmental 
law. 53 The first IS the ··dual regulation" or "state pn-
macy" model. underwhtch states are administrative-
ly delegated regulatory pnmacy to enforce federal 
laws through existing state laws and institutions. 
The second IS the "collaborative management" or 
"consensus-based" model. under which a JOint fed-
eral, multi-state mstitution IS created for the sole 
purpose of developing consensus denved plans that 
will be used by the vanous junsdictions to manage 
federally designated natural resources. The final 
model is the "layered federalism" or "consistency'" 
model. under which Individual states develop and 
admimster natural resource management plans with 
which proposed federal activities must be consis-
tent.54 An analysis of each of these models shows 
that at least two of them offer some advancement 
over the existing "dominant federal" model and thus 
suggest some direction for Improvements to it. 55 
A "The State Primacy" or "Dual Regulation" Model 
The first model Is the state pnmacy or "dual reg-
ulation" model used by the federal pollution control 
laws. Under this model, federal regulatory authority 
IS admimstratively delegated to states with federally 
53. While it will be qmckly apparent, even from the abbrevi-
ated descnptions of the three alternative models set forth In the 
text above. that each contams features of the other and even of 
the "dommant federal" model, they are still suffidently different 
from each other and the ex1sting model to warrant the compara· 
tive analysiS undertaken m the Artide. 
54. For a discussion of the perils of usmg either the "dual 
regulation· or "layered federalism· models to regulate the con· 
verswn of wetlands, see Oliver A Houck & Michael Rolland, 
Federalism m Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of DelcgJUon of Clc;m 
Water At.t Section 404 and Related Programs to tfle Stales, 54 MD. L. REv. 
1242 (1995). 
55. It 1s difficult to ascertam to what extent the problems 
Identified m both the current "dommant federal" model and three 
alternative models are attributable to defects in the models 
themselves or to the mdiv1duals working within the models. As 
such an analys1s would move th1s Artide far beyond its Intended 
purpose, th1s confounding factor IS merely noted here as one war-
ranting further exammation before the "cha1rs are rearranged on 
the decks of the Titamc.· 
56. The dass1c example of th1s model can be found In § 402 
of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994) (national 
pollution discharge elimmation system permits). 
57. See. e.g., CWA § 106, 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1994) (grants to 
states and mterstate agenaes to assist them in administering 
programs for the prevention, reduction and elimination of poilu· 
tion, mduding enforcement directly or through appropnate state 
law enforcement officers or agenaes). 
approved programs giving the states de jure primary 
regulatory authority to implement federal direc-
tives.u Federal funds are granted annually to offset 
the costs of administering the federal program.57 
The "dual regulation" model, at least facially, 
offers substantial enhancement of the state role in 
admimstering federal laws, as state agencies. laws 
and courts replace their federal equivalents. 
However, although states develop, implement and 
enforce their own regulatory programs under this 
model. these programs must be consistent with (at 
least as stnngent as) their federal counterpart.53 To 
assure this result, the federal government closely 
oversees state compliance with federal standards59 
and retains authority to reassert federal jurisdic-
tion, restrict or condition federal funding of the 
state program, or enforce directly, if state perfor-
mance is deemed derelict.60 Although the "dual reg-
ulation" model has some positive features. chief 
among whrch is the prospect that its insistence on 
uniform standards will achieve national norms and 
avoid inequities among the states. the model has 
some serious deficienctes making its application to 
public domain lands problematic .61 
The first of these problems is its uneasy histori-
cal fit with the public lands experience, despite the 
fact that both models rest on a presumption of fed-
eral authority to regulate the activities proscribed by 
Congress. Ill The very practical reasons behind dele-
gating primary jurisdiction to implement pollution 
control laws to the states, i.e., the nation's size and 
58. Su, t.g., O.'IA § 510. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994) (states may 
not adopt or enforce standards which are •Jess stnngent than· 
federal standards). Ste-.vart chafes at this dictating of conduct 
within other Institutions and recommends instead the use or 
Indirect methods. such as transferable pollution credits. to 
achieve the destred •strategic coupling• of the lnstltution·s dea-
slons with national norms and goals. Stewart, supra note 25, at 
352-53. To the extent that this arrangement might also be VIewed 
as ·commandeering· the legtslatlve and admtnlstratlve processes 
of state governments, the specter of New YorK v. United States. 
505 U.S. 144. 156, (1992), must be countered \vith. See Powell. 
supra note 22 (critlcwng the Court's historical anai;'SIS); Althouse, 
supra note 25 (el!Jllorlng recent e-;olution In Court's federalism 
Junsprudence re-;eJJing Its points of convergence. but ultimate 
divergence over its meaning). 
59. Stt, t.g., 0.'/A § 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1994) (fedec· 
al re-;ie-.v of state-Issued national pollution discharge elimination 
S}'Stem permits). 
60. Su, t.g., O.'IA § 402(c). 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1994) (crite-
ria for withdravtal of federal appro·tal of state national pollution 
discharge elimination S}'Stem permit programs). 
61. This feature is of particular importance m the field of pol· 
lutlon control, where the concern is that the absence of a strong 
federal presence will result in ·an une-;en p!a-;mg field dotted with 
pollution havens.· Houck& Rolland, supra note 54, at 1299-1300. 
62. The extent to which states may be compelled to Imple-
ment federal directi'les premised on Commerce Clause )unsdlc-
tlon has been thrown Into question by se-.-eral recent u.s. 
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geographic diversity, the close relationship between 
pollution and land use (long-considered a local pre-
rogative),63 the federal government's limited 
resources, and the states' prev1ous expenence 
admm1stenng laws of th1s type, only partially res-
onate with the public lands expenence.64 Although 
there IS diversity among the types of public domam 
lands and the1r acreage IS vast, the "dommant feder-
al" model reqUires fewer federal resources to admm-
lster than are reqUired for the admm1stration of pol-
lution control programs regulating millions of mdi-
VIdual sources.65 Further. no argument for state pn-
macy on public lands based on expenence or local 
prerogative can be made, because the prevailing 
"dommant federal" model excluded (and still 
excludes) the states from any meanmgful manage-
ment role. Thus, the state expenence admm1stenng 
pollution control laws at the state level before the 
1970s was significantly more substantial, although 
less felicitous,66 than the state expenence managmg 
resources on state public67 and school trust lands.68 
Supreme Court dectstons. See, e.g., Semmole Tribe of Flonda v. 
Flonda, 64 U.S.L.W. 64 (March 26, 1996) (holding Congress lacks 
power under Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states' 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity from suit m federal court): Lopez 
v. United States. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down the Gun 
Free School Zones Act on the ground it exceeded Congress' 
Commerce Clause authority smce possesston of a gun m a local 
school zone ts not an economtc activity substantially affecting 
interstate commerce); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
( 1992) (holding unconstitutional"take title" provtston of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 to the 
extent it "commandeered" the legtslative processes of the states). 
63. Wickersham, supra note 25 (dommant model of land use 
regulation m thts country ts local control of land use through 
"Euclidean" zonmg). 
64. It ts mteresting to note that these reasons resulted m 
state regulatory pnmacy to admtmster pollution control pro-
grams, even though there was a sense with regard to federal reg-
ulatory and soctal programs m general that the national govern-
ment's performance would be supenor to that of the states and 
that federal programs were correctives for state and local neglect 
and local entrenchment of pnvilege. Stewart, supra note 25, at 340. 
65. To give the reader an tdea of the enormity of the regulato-
ry umverse admmtstered by the states, the U.S. Envuonmental 
Protection Agency collects mformation under vanous federal pollu-
tion control laws about more than 30,000 abandoned or uncon-
trolled hazardous waste sites, 328 toxtc chemtcals released to the atr. 
water and land from more than 17,000 manufactunng fadlities, and 
has a database for water quality mformation alone that contams 
over 170 million data pomts on surface and groundwater quality, 
sediments, streamflow, and fish tissue contammation, whtch pro-
vtdes information on whtch regulatory programs pnnopally admm-
istered by the states are based. COUNCI~ ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAIJlY, 
supra note 40, at 260-61. 
66. Marc Melntck & Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy Store: 
EPA Overfiling of L.ocal Nr Pollution Vanances, 20 EcoLOGY L.Q. 207, 
253-54 (1993) (noting reluctance of state and local distncts to 
enact stnngent envtronmental regulations). 
67. According to a 1970 survey conducted by the Public 
Land Law Revtew Commtsston, states admtmster about 4% of the 
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The "dual regulation" model also has some serl· 
ous des1gn defic1enc1es wh1ch m1ght lessen its effec· 
tiveness when applied to the nation's public domain 
lands. First, the model tnes unsuccessfully to syn· 
thes1ze two mherently conflicting goals-state prl· 
macy and the achievement of national norms. This 
tens1on often emerges m matters mvolvmg state 
enforcement of federal pollution control mandates. 
States generally prefer a more cooperative, flexible 
approach toward envuonmental enforcement than 
allowed under the federal law. State agenc1es want 
to accommodate local mdustnes and are sensitive 
to local political pressure. Federal agenc1es, mindful 
of federal mandates that specifically disallow "local" 
conslderations,69 walk a tightrope between the 
state's des1re for flexibility and the national need for 
uniformity and cons1stency.1o 
Further, a governance des1gn, m which one 
JUnsdiction takes the lead m developmg polic1es 
the other has pnmary responsibility for Implement· 
mg, 1s bound to cause conflict.71 Indeed, the feder· 
total land mass of the United States. These lands Include approx· 
tmately 20 million acres of lands designated as forests and 13% 
of the lands used for grazmg under government (federal or state) 
control. Excluding Alaska, state agenctes control nearly as much 
land as federal agenctes dedicated to propagation of fish and 
wildlife, but a Significantly smaller fraction of the total land ded· 
tcated to public park USe. PUBUC LAND LAw REVIEW COMMISSION, 
STATE LAND RESOURCES AND POUCIES, at 5-1, 5-2 ( 1970), More recent 
mformation about the acreage administered by the states can be 
found tn WESTERN STATE LAND COMMISSIONERS AssociATION, 1991-92 
DIRECTORY, tbl. I (19921 (states hold more than 45 million acres), 
quoted rn Bruce & Rice. supra note 41. at 2. See also Sally K. Fairfax 
et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresft Look at Conventional Wisdom. 22 
ENVT~. L. 797, 832 (1992) (41 million acres managed as grant 
lands). 
68. For example. Fatrfax et al. fmd m state management of 
school trust lands, models and approaches to public resource 
management that mtght "enrich discussions of public resource 
management now dommated by desiccated and polarized Issues 
ansmg at the federal level." Fatrfax et al.. supra note 67, at 803. Stt 
also Cowart & Fatrfax, supra note 6. For critical vtews of state land 
management, see Hetdelberg, supra note 41. at 1582 (current 
framework governmg management of state school lands should 
be modified): Bruce & Rice, supra note 41. at 23-26 (land man· 
agement polictes of western states ts lagging behind times 
because states vtew public lands pnmarily as Income source and 
believe thetr resources are perpetual). 
69. Melntck & Willes, supra note 66, at 235. 
70. James Elder. former Director. EPA Office of Water 
Enforcement and Permits, has described this relationship as 
"EPA's tightrope walk between the need for national consistency 
and state flexibility m Implementation." James R. Elder, Regulation 
of Water Quality: Is EPA Muting lis Obligations or Can tftt Statts Btlltr 
Mttt Water Quality Challtnges?, In AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, FEDERAL 
VERSUS STATE ENVJRONMENTA~ PROTECTION STANDARDS: CAN A NATIONAL 
POUCY BE IMPLEMENTED LocALLY? 20 (1990). 
71. Stt generally E. Donald Elliott, Ftdtral Versus Start 
Envtronrnenral Protection Standards: Can a Nallonal Pol/ell Be lrnpltrntllttd 
L.ocally? Ktgnott Presentation: Making the Parlnersftip Work, 22 Envtl. L. 
Rep.(Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,010 (1992): Melmck & Willes. supra note 66: 
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al-state relationship m the "dual regulation" model 
has been burdened almost to the pomt of disability 
by allegations of mcons1stent federal oversight and 
micro-management of state programs, wasteful 
duplication of effort, delayed and conflicting deci-
sions, and lack of finality.n 
The "dual regulation" model. with its reluctant 
sharing of power with the states, has not productive-
ly synthesized the conflicts between the two junsdic· 
tions.n The model's concentric, overlapping power 
shanng structure reflects an mherent distrust of state 
performance, a distrust almost as great as that reflect· 
ed m the "dommant federal" model that grants states 
no role at all m the admm1stration of federal land 
management programs. A model that is premised on 
distrust of the state partner and results m stramed 
mter-govemmental relationships would be no 
improvement over the "dommant federal" model.74 
In addition, the political unpopularity of feder· 
al oversight "stick.s"75 and limited federal resources 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OmC£, PuB. No. GAO/RCED-9~. EPA AND 
THE STATES: ENVIRONMENTAL CHAL!.ENGES REoUIRE A BEllER WOIU:U:G 
RELATIONSHIP (1995). For a more salutary VIew of the ameliorative 
effects of thts conflict. see Houck and Rolland who label as "acd· 
dental gemus· the dual agency reVIew model of the federal wet· 
lands permitting program, the protective qualities of which are 
further enhanced by the partiopation of other federal and state 
agenoes as well as the public. They attribute to the model a •ae-
ative tension· that helps offset the power of money, mfluence and 
pnvate property nghts and warn that "(a)ny regulatory program 
that vests deoston-making authority exclustvely In one agency 
runs a great nsk of failure." Houck & Rolland, supra. note 54, at 
1312. 
72. GENERAL ACCOUNTING Orne£, supra note 71. The states 
additionally complam that federal funds and techmcal assistance 
are 1nsuffiaent to offset the burden of being the pnmary regula· 
tory authority. For an analysts of EPA overfillng of local air pollu-
tion vanances. mcluding the reasons why EPA engages In this 
practice. see Melmck & Willes, supra. note 66. Yet complete 
absence of federal overstght would be as mappropnate on public 
lands as it would be under the pollution control laws given the 
need m both situations for national uniformity to avoid Industry 
forum shoppmg and mequity among the several states. Richard 
B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Pro&ltms of Federalism In Mandating 
Stale Implementation of National Environmental PoUcy, 86 YALE L.J. I 196 
(1977). 
73. Thts concept of "shanng power" with the states might 
have been baffling to the Framers of the Constitution, who, 
although they shared the assumption that sovereignty was unl· 
tary and exclustve and, therefore either the national Congress or 
state legislatures had to predommate, dunng the course of the 
debates grew to accept the tdea that both the central (or nation-
al) government and the states could exerose sovereignty In their 
separate spheres. Conststent with that VISion, Madison argued 
that the greatest sphere of government activity would be at the 
state level. However. anti-Federalists feared the effect of 
Madison's vts1on of federalism would be to reduce states to the 
status of towns, retammg only the power to levy taxes, and to ae-
ate a consolidated national government Powell, supra. note 22, at 
656 n. I I 7. See generally id. at 652-64 • According to some scholars. 
power shanng IS a natural outgrowth of the structural, admlnls· 
trative, cultural, and political forces at play In the twentieth cen· 
supporting their use results in uneven, often inef· 
fective federal oversight. Ineffective federal over· 
sight of state performance curtails the federal gov· 
emment's capacity to counter-balance excessive 
state responsiveness to local political and econom· 
1c pressure. This puts at risk the model's ability to 
achieve national norms and avoid distributional 
inequities among the several states, undermining 
the theoretical advantages of the model.76 At the 
same time, the pressure to maintain national norms 
makes the federal government uneasy about 
approving experimentation and diversity in state 
regulatory programs.n Therefore, the "dual regula· 
tion" model might inhibit federal land managers 
from responding to the need for regional variations 
in natural resource management strategies. 
The "dual regulation" model does not correct 
the problems caused by the fragmentation of natur· 
al systems by political boundaries, since it preserves 
the state as the decisionmaking unit.7S The "dual. 
tury. Kramer, supra note 22. For a modem-day affirmation of 
Madison's vision of where the most relevant political authority 
would reside for dtizens, see U. at I 504 (stating that the law that 
most affects people tn thetr dally lives Is still o·;erwhelmmgiy 
state Jaw). 
, 74. Although the "dual regulation· model appears to o!S-
perse power more than the "dommant federal" model, reduong 
the capture possibilities, in actuality there Is no difference. BLM 
administers its programs through field offices m the several 
states and thus presents as dispersed a target as the state natur-
al resource or land management agencies. 
75. Su, t.g., OIJA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1994) 
(resumption of federal primacy); OVA § IC6(fJ(2J. 33 U.S.C. § 
1256(fJ(2) (1994) (conditioning or reduction of federal grants); 
Clean Air Act {CAA) § 179(a). 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (19941 (htghway 
funds are cut off for non-attainment areas). 
76. For example. as Melnld: and Willes pomt out revocation 
of state enforcement authority under the CAA would be unwise 
because the states do 70% to 90% of all enforcement under that 
law. Melntd: & Willes. supra note 66. at 246. 
77. Vanous mechanisms in the "dual regulation· model 
allow for site-specific adjustments to national standards (e.g., 
state water quality standards and state implementation plans 
under the CAA) and local expenmentation (vanances) and pro-
vide some accommodation between local needs and national 
standards. SOme commentators aitioze these de-11ces because 
the over-arching goals of a prot:ram (i.e., its national norms) tend 
to get lost In ad hoc process of e:t.aminlng the equities in mdi-
vldual cases. Melnick.& Willes. supra note 66, at 254. 
78. For a discussion of how Insensitive and Inadequate the 
pollution controllav.'S are with respect to preserving blodiver.;ity. 
see ton D. Holst, Tr.t Un!cmz.16fuly f'a!lar: Ftdtral Lanis. Manag~ng far 
Unctttalnll/. and tf.t PnurvJtlJn cf Bb!cf.!al Dlvmity, 13 Pull. l.A!lo L. 
REv. I 13 (1~2). Su al;o GEtiERAL AcCO!J!ITI!IC: OmC£. Pull. No. 
GAO/RCED-96-42, WJJER Powmo:1: DtfFEREtiCES k.!ONC: THE 
SWES Ill lss\/I!IG Pa!.urs W.!1TI!IG THE DiSCHA.IU:E Oli' PO!.LIJ'Wi'IS 
(1996) {explaining that variations In discharge limits or m stan-
dards and procedures used to denve these limits, have been the 
source of concern, particularly when nelghbonng junsdictions 
share water bodies). 
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I Hope M. Babcock regulation" model allows states to develop regulato-ry regimes that reflect a state's pnorities with respect to use of the ambient enVIronment,79 These regimes 
can b1sect an mter-state resource like a nver or an 
a1rshed, artificially dividing the ambient environ-
ment at the state's boundary.ao Only rarely does the 
model allow for regional planmng or standard set-
tings! opemng only a very small wmdow for Imple-
menting the cross-)unsdictional, Iandscape-onent-
ed protection favored by conservation biologists.s2 
Further, as pnnc1pally a creature of the admm-
Istrative state, the content and contours of the "dual 
regulation" model, even more than those of the 
"dommant federal" model, are formed, shaped and 
reformed through the formalism of the admmistra-
tive process.s3 Th1s formalism, together with the 
b1polar and adversanal nature of adm1mstrative 
proceedings and their dependence on "specialized 
scientific knowledge, techmcal )argon,"B4 and 
lawyers, creates multiple barners to public particl-
pation,85 especially by mchoate, fragmented com-
munity-based mterest groupmgs.86 Studies have 
shown that elaborate admmistrative procedures 
have had little success m democratizmg admmistra-
tive decisionmakmg.B7 What public access IS pro-
79. Thts ts the concept behmd the CAI\s state tmplementa· 
tion plan (SIP). 42 U.S.C. § 7410 ( 1994). Ste Unton Elec. Co. v. EPA. 
427 U.S. 246 ( 1976). Allowmg states to localize national standards 
also underlies the concept of state water quality standards found 
m the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). See also 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(b)( II( C) (19941 (water quality based effluent limits). 
80. See, e.g .. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). See 
also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 78 ( expfatntng that van· 
ations m discharge limits or standards and procedures used to 
denve these limits, have been the source of concern. particularly 
when netghbonng (Urtsdictions share water bodies). Another 
example of states bemg unable to manage a resource collective· 
ly can be found m the debates over the adoption of the zero emts· 
sion vehtde (ZEV) as the standard for emtsstons of ozone precur-
sors in the Northeast. Susan Brunmga, Air Pollution: OTC Rta/firms 
Support for 49-State Car, States Rights, DAILY ENv'T REP., Mar. I, 1995; 
)ennlfer Silverman, Air Pollution: Individual States Rtmam Adamant 
Ahout ZEV Mandate, Despite Big Three Letter, DAILY ENv'T REP., july 13, 
1995: Air Pollution: DtciSton on Auto Plan for Nortfteast Delayed Until 
Mid-December Agency Says, DAILY ENv'T REP., Nov. 18, 1994. 
81. See. e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1994) (convenmg of mter-
state management conference to address mterstate water quality 
problems); id. § 1288 (areawtde waste treatment management 
plans); ld. § 1289 (nver basm plans) 
82. Holst, supra note 78, at 133. 
83. For examples of thts formalism m the CWA, see CWA §§ 
402(b)(3), (c)(3), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b)(3), (c)(3) (1994) (state pro-
gram delegation and federal resumption of regulatory ]Unsdic-
tion, respectively). Ste also CWA § 309(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4) 
(1994) (enforcement). 
84. Thomas L. Van Valey & James C. Petersen, Public Semce 
Centers: Tftt Micftlgan Expenence, tn CmzEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBUC 
DECISION MAKING 39 (Jack DeSano & Stuart Langton eds., 1987). 
85. Junsdictional barners, such as standing, and the need to 
develop a persuastve admmtstrative record tmpose real costs on 
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duced IS systematically unrepresentative of the 
public mterest and favors mterests that are already 
mfluentiai.8B For example, public heanngs, when 
they do occur, often occur late in the decision mak-
mg process, at mconvement times (i.e., during 
workmg hours), are mhibiting m format. and fre-
quently pit ordinary citizens agamst technical 
experts from the agency or applicant.B9 The agencies 
admm1stenng these proceedings have neither the 
flexibility nor resources to respond, other than In 
the most superficial way, to the cacophony of vole· 
es heard m typical public heanng or formal written 
submission.90 The process responds best to the 
entrenched, familiar voices that collect around uni-
fied positions.91 
There 1s little reason to expect. therefore, that 
transfernng the "dual regulation" model to public 
domam lands would elimmate problems with the 
"dommant federal" model. The model might even 
exacerbate existing federal-state tensiOns on public 
domam lands and lead to further erosion of nation-
al norms despite the theoretical promise of the 
reverse result. The model does nothmg to elimmate 
the existing politically fragmented natural land-
scape, and its complete dependence on the admin-
partictpants m the admtmstrative process. Robert B. Reich, Public 
Admtmstrafion and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive EsSal/. 94 Yale L J, 
1617, 1624 (1985). For a general discussion of the administrative 
process. see (ames T. Harnngton & Barbara A, Frick, Opportunities 
{or Pu&lic PartiCipation m Admtmslrative Rulema~ing, 15 NAT. RESoRcts 
LAw. 537 (1983). 
86. The admmtstrative and JUdictal processes require partie· 
tpant to distill thetr interests into highly focused, oppositional 
statements or positions. Although one may be able to Identify 
discrete public lands communities, these communities are made 
up of many people with different Interests and values which can· 
not easily be reduced to smgle, unitary positions. Bates, supra 
note 16. See also Retch, supra note 85, at 1624. 
87. Ethndge, supra note 50, at 115, I 22. Ethridge goes on to 
say "citizen partiapation encouraged by formal hearing proce· 
dures has not often contributed to the 'complicated, creative bal· 
ancmg of conflicting mterests m controversial areas: Instead, It 
has frequently served to make discussions of public policies 
more tdeologtcal. more difficult. and less representative of the 
broader public mterest." I d. at I 24. 
88. Ethndge, supra note 50, at I I 5, I 29 (quoting Walter A. 
Rosenbaum, The Paradoxes of Public Participation. 
Admmtstration and Soctety 8:3:355-83 (1976)). 
89. Junsdictional standing to secure judicial review of 
admmtstrative dectslons, the techmcality and complexity of the 
record, costs, and other procedural formalities create barriers to 
public partictpation under thts model. Owen M. Flss, Comment, 
Agamsl Settlement, 93 YALE L.). 1073, 1073-78 (1984): Melanie 
Rowland, Bargarmng for Ufe: Prolecllng Biodivtrsilll Tftrough Mediated 
Agreements, 22 ENVTL. L. 503, 5 I 9 (I 992). 
90. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Ste also Bates, 
supra note 16. at 91 (noting that most public hearings are 
arranged to tmpede community consensus). 
91. Retch, supra note 85, at 1624. 
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1strative process for making dec1sions may erect 
a?ditional barners to diversified, community-based 
public participation m the public lands manage-
ment dec1sionmaklng process. 
B. The "Federal-State Consensus" Or "Collaborative 
Management" Model 
The second model 1s the federal-state consen-
sus or "collaborative management" model employed 
by the Clean Water Act's National Estuary Program.92 
Under th1s model, the federal government funds and 
facilitates the development of an mstitution to deve-
lope a plan to address the envuonmental and 
resource depletion problems caused by unregulated 
human activities m the estuary.93 There IS much to 
commend in th1s model for the management of pub-
lic domam lands. 
First, estuanes and public domam lands share 
common h1stoncal predicates. Both are multi-Jurisdic-
tional and have h1stoncally functioned as unregulated 
commons.94 Federal land holdings m many parts of the 
West are neither unified nor integrated, but mter-mtxed 
with state and pnvate mholdings.95 Further; develop-
92. 33 u.s.c. § 1330 (1994}. The progenitor of the federal-
state consensus model found m the National Estuary Program Is 
the mterstate management plan developed by Maryland, Virginia, 
Pennsylvama. and the Distnct of Columbia to restore and protect 
the Chesapeake Bay. For a detailed chronology of the develop-
ment of that plan and the Chesapeake Bay program, see Matorie 
A. Hutter, Tne Cliesapeaf:e ~!I= Sa.vmg a Nalio;al Resource Tflrougfi 
Mulli-Siale Cooperation, 4 VA.). NAT. REsoURCES L. 186 (1985). 
93. Agncultural, mdustnal, muniopal, recreational, and 
other activities on the land can both directly and mdirectly affect 
estuanne water quality and hydrodynamics. Both atmospheric 
and land based pollutants can concentrate m and be retained by 
an estuary. Robert D. Hayton, Reflections on !f:e Esluanne Zont, 31 NAT. 
REsouRCES J. 123, 136 ( 1991 ). According to Hayton, these problems 
have brought on a cns1s of global proportions. ld. at 125. 
94. The estuanne zone 1s not sharply delineated, but like 
any ecosystem IS a dynam1c, sometimes turbulent, and often 
extens1ve reg1on. Thus, many states may find themselves In the 
estuanne zone even though the1r dtizens may not directly bene-
fit from its ex1stence. For a descnption of the estuarine (or Inter-
face) zone and the value of estuanne systems, see ld. 
95. As pomted out by Cowart and Faufax, surface title Is not 
the only complexity m the pattern of western land ownership as 
a result of the federal practice of retammg subsurface mineral 
nghts when it deeded away land to homesteaders and ranchers. 
Cowart & Faufax, supra note 6, at 410-12. 
96. ld. at 410 (noting particularly the contentiousness of 
access to federal lands surrounded by state or pnvate lands}. 
97. Agam. according to Cowart and Fairfax , the reality of 
western land ownersh1p patterns mvites (some might say 
requues) some level of state and local Involvement In the man-
agement of public domam lands and resources. ld. The theoreti-
cal framework for these observations can be found In the work of 
Grodz1ns and others. MORiON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN 5\"Sre.l: A 
NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1966), cited In Fairfax 
et al.. supra note 6, at 420 n.l7. For further explication of this the-
oretical framework and its progenitors, see Kramer, supra note 22. 
ment on public lands is often tied to development on 
nearby state and pnvate lands.96 This checkerboard 
pattern of intermmgled land holdings continues today 
making integrated management of public domain 
lands a multi-jurisdictional challenge.w 
Public domam lands have also historically func-
tioned as an unregulated commons, susceptible to 
Hardin's "tragedy."'9s Although public domain lands 
may not be a "true" or "legal" commons, as they are 
subject to laws regulating their use and access. they 
function as a de facto commons. because these laws 
have not been consistently enforced.W Unauthorized 
use and access to these lands occurred historically 
and continues to occur today.scv Therefore. the pub-
lic domain lands experience appears to be more 
congruent with the "collaborative management" 
model than with the "dual regulation" model. 
The multi-jurisdictional and un-regulated com-
mons charactenstics of estuaries resulted in the for-
mulation of a collaborative, non-directive gover-
nance model, quite different in approach from the 
"dominant federal" or "dual regulation" models.sos 
The National Estuary Program's "collaborative man-
98. Stz Garrett Hardin, Tf.t Trag!dy of tF.t Ccmll'.ans, 162 Son:CE 
1243 (1968). r;pnnlt.1 In MA!I.I.C'.::G THE Co~.t•.!o::s (Garrett Hardin & 
James Baden eds .• 1977) (where mall"/ actors share the same 
resource. rational choice leads to the resource's eventual destruc:-
tlon. because an individual's short term ealn e:r.ceeds her harm and 
the harm to the resource can be dispersed among its many users}. 
99. James Huffman, 'Tf.t lrr.ililcility cf Pm-ate f'Jgfils rn PuEIIc 
LAnds, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 241, 259 (1994}. Huffman argues that 
well Into the twentieth century most non-commodity resources. 
like wildlire, hiking. camping. and boatlne. were free for the tak-
Ing. !d. at 260. These unauthoriZed uses were then leaitimiZed by 
the preemption laws. ld. at 259 (discussion of preemption lav.-s}. 
Huffman goes on to arcue that unlimited equal access wiJIIead 
to the tragedy or the commons and its destruction, and while lim-
Iting equal access may alfe'ltate diStributional and degradation 
problems, this can only be accomplished at an unatceptably h1gh 
cost to average andiv1dual welfare. 1:1. at 271. 
100. For example. the failure of BU.! to control access by 
cattle to public domain lands makes the public lands a commons 
for that purpose and, according to most experts, IS the reason for 
the loss or hundreds of millions of acres of and and sem1-and 
land In the western United States. George C. Coggins, Lr:2Stcci 
Gr.nlng on tF.t Pu61l& LAnds; Ltssans from tF.t Failure cf Offiml 
Consm'J.Ilon, 20 Go:;z. L. REv. 749 ( 1934-85): Coggins et al., Tli! Ltr.v 
•I Pu611c Rangtland Mar-2J!Il'.tnll: TF.t Extml and Disltivulian cf Fed.."Ta! 
P.r.w; 12 EtMt.. L. 535 (1982): Myra Klod:enbnnk. Tli! Neo.v Rangt 
War HilS !F:t D&tt 11S a Fe!, N.Y. T!!.!£5. Aug. 20, 1991, at C-4. 
101. Under our constitutional Sj'Stem of gcr:ernment, one 
state has no pa· • ..-er to control another; and the federal sovere1gn 
has neither the political will nor the resources to force a federal 
solution on the states In an h1Stoncally unregulated, multi-state 
commons. For examples of unsuccessful attempts by states to 
control water pollution 1n adjacent states. see Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); City of Milv.aukee v. IllinoiS, 451 
U.S. 304 (1981). For a discussion of some other examples of 
regional planning by states, see Paul D. Banker. Jr.. Note, Tfie 
Cf:esarmz Bay Prmr.·Jtbn All: TF.t Praf!.'ll'. ~i~ State LAnd Rtguulian 
•flnltrslillt Rtsoums, 31 W1.t. & MASY L. REv. 735, 739-44 (1990}. 
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agement" model establishes an mstitutional frame-
work and process for preparation of a multi-state 
plan to restore and mamtam the ecological mtegn-
ty of designated estuanes.1o2 The plan ts prepared 
under the aegts of a "management conference" 
composed of representatives from all affected polit-
Ical JUnsdictions (i.e., federal. state and local gov-
ernments and mter-state governmental entities) 
and mterests m the estuanne zone.to3 Management 
plans can only be approved by the federal govern-
ment upon concurrence by the affected states' gov-
ernors.to4 Once approved, any federal action must 
be consistent with the plan.to5 
The "collaborative management" model. on its 
face, provtdes for significant reductions m federal-
Ism tenstons. The parties operate m an non-hterar-
chtcal (i.e. the requirement for state concurrence), 
cooperative effort to destgn a solution to what ts 
percetved to be a shared problem.106 Thts contrasts 
sharply with the hterarchtcal, non-parity, directive 
federal-state relationship m both the "dommant fed-
eral" and "dual regulation" models. Under the "col-
laborative management" model, the federal govern-
ment functions as a facilitator, not an overseer, of 
state and local participation, as opposed to perfor-
mance, and as a provtder of techmcal and financtal 
resources to atd m plan development. Acceptance of 
I 02. As part of the plan development process. the manage-
ment conference assesses trends m the estuary's water quality, 
the VIability of its natural resources and des1gnated uses, collects 
and analyzes data on the causes of the estuary's decline, and pro-
VIdes for the coordinated Implementation of the plan by federal, 
state and local agenc1es. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1994). The 
Conference also has the authority to determme the extent to 
wh1ch federal proJects and programs are consistent with the plan. 
103. States, federal agenoes, reg1onal and mtemational 
authorities. educational mstitutions, and mterested members of 
the public m the des1gnated "estuanne zone" form the membership 
of the Management Conference. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(c) (1994). Given 
the breadth of the statutory definition of the term ·estuanne zone; 
(includes ·assoaated aquatic ecosystems and those portions of 
tributanes drammg mto the estuary up to the h1stonc he1ght of 
migration of anadromous fish or the h1stonc head of tidal mflu-
ence, whichever IS h1gher." 33 U.S.C. § 1330(k) (1994)), it 1s not 
unreasonable to conclude that the mtent of the drafters was to 
mclude as many )unsdictions m the plannmg process as possible. 
104. 33 u.s.c. § 1330(f} (1994). 
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b)(7) (1994). The effect of the consis-
tency mechamsm under the collaborative management" model1s 
less clear than under the "layered federalism" model. Only those 
programs wh1ch are listed m the catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance are covered by § 320(b){7), 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b)(7) 
(1994), and the mechamsm IS tied mtoa rev1ew process tnggered 
by Executive Order 12,372, repnnted as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 6506 
(1994). While the Executive Order blocks Implementation of 
mcons1stent federal programs. the Order IS not codified m the 
statute and IS thus subJect to modification by subsequent presi-
dents. 
I 06. On the top1c of mter-state cooperation and federalism 
see Note, To Form a Mort Perfect Umon?: Federalism and Informal 
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the plan at the local level ts enhanced because of 
direct partictpatton m plan destgn by state and local 
governments and the mcreased likelihood such par-
ticipation has resulted m a document more sensitive 
to state and local concerns. 
However, the consensus process can also gen-
erate substantial transaction coststo7 and result in 
a compromtsed final product.toa There are no con· 
trolling norms gutding federal approval of the plan, 
no reqUirement that the plan even meet federal 
standards, unlike the "dual regulatton" modeJ.I09 
Therefore, there ts no way of assurmg that distribu-
tional mequities between estuanes m different 
parts of the country will not be created. Further, 
plan Implementation depends upon the voluntary 
cooperation of affected JUrisdictions and must 
await separate action by state and local govern-
ments conformmg thetr laws to whatever new stan-
dards or procedures are requtred by the plan.tto The 
management conference has no contmumg func-
tion once the plan ts approved. 
The "collaborative management" model. how-
ever, does a significantly better JOb than either the 
"dommant federal" or "dual regulation" models of 
removmg the barners to rational ecosystem man-
agement, because it offers a trans-political bound-
ary mstitutional framework (the management con· 
Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REv 842 ( 1989). The author's 
analys1s of the National Association of Attorneys General vertical 
restram gUidelines demonstrates how mterstate cooperation pre• 
serves the core values of federalism (liberty, civic participation, 
and diversity). 
107. The model requues the creation of a separate, new 
mstitution (the management conference), multiple public hear· 
mgs, and extens1ve mformation gathenng and analysts. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1330 (1994). Reflecting the additional time It takes to create a 
document by committee, most of the plans developed under this 
model have taken m excess of four years to complete. HoWARD 
RAIFFA, THE AF:r AND SCIENCE OF NECOTIAnON 215-55. Set a/so 
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: 
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPIJTI:S JQ-15 (1987) 
(identifymg some of the questions ra1sed by negotiating public 
disputes). 
108. Fiss, supra note 89, at 1073-78; Rowland, supra note 89, 
at 519. see also Frank P. Grad. Alternative Dlspure Resolul/on In 
Envrronmental Law, 14 COLUM. J, ENVTL. L. 157, 184 (1989) (ADR's 
•wm-wm· trade-off 1S deceptive because if everyone gains, It Is 
likely that someone not mvolved m the trade will have to pay and, 
m the envuonmental field, the loser may well be the public Inter· 
est m preservmg envuonmental resources for the future). 
109. See 33 U.S.C. § 1330(f) (1994) (approval procedures for 
the estuary plan requues mclus1on of priority corrective actions 
and compliance schedules to meet the<::WA's asplratlonal goals). 
110. The CWA relies on the prospect of federal financial 
assistance to encourage plan Implementation 33 U.S.C. § 
1330(f)(2) (1994). As an ultra-runsdictional solution to a multi· 
state problem, unless states voluntarily Incorporate the direc· 
tives of a management plan, the plan's Implementation and 
enforcement 1s totally dependent upon Individual state enforce· 
ment authority, wh1ch cannot transcend political boundaries, 
Winter 1996 
ference) for managing a regional resource. The goal 
of the.model's plannmg process IS to synthesize and 
rationalize differences among the affected states m 
how they manage the natural system; m other 
words, to eliminate the artificial differences caused 
by political boundanes. Most plans also provide for 
future plan adjustments, allowmg for conservation 
biology's adaptive management. Ill 
The structure of the "collaborative manage-
ment" model's management conference, with its 
many different participants and its use of a consen-
sus, collaborative approach to decis1onmakmg (i.e., 
the plannmg process), encourages diversity of 
views. A consensus approach is more open to dif-
ferent communities than the formal bi-polar, adver-
sanal approach of the "dommant federal" and "dual 
regulation" models.ll2 The democratic, more trans-
parent nature of the planmng process levels the 
playmg field between community-based interests 
and special interests. The participation of commu-
nity-based mterests m the process also validates 
and strengthens the mterests they represent, 
increasmg public confidence m the final product. Ill 
While the "collaborative management" model 
harbors some significant nsks, such as h1gh trans-
action costs, the possibility of a compromised final 
product and sacrificed national norms as well as 
Implementation uncertamty, it offers a means to 
overcome the federalism fnctions now present on 
public domam lands as well as the ecosystem man-
agement and public participation problems mher-
ent m both the "dommant federal" and "dual regu-
lation" models. The shared h1stoncal predicates 
with the "dommant federal" model may also make 
the Imposition of this consensus dnven model on 
public domam lands an eas1er fit than the "dual reg-
ulation" model. 
C. "Federal Consistency" Or "Layered Federalism" 
Model 
The third, and final model IS the "federal con-
Ill. Included m the plan are normative guidance (statutory 
and regulatory standards) and shared aspuatlonal goals, which 
may reduce future conflicts. 33 U.S.C. 9 1330 (1994): 40 C.F.R. 9§ 
35.9000-35.9070 (1995). 
112. Re1ch, supra note 85, at 1624 (discussing how current 
practice of public policymaking Ignores the v1ews and Interests of 
poor and diffused groups). The author suggests that public delib-
eration is benefiaal to these groups as it bnngs them together 
where they are able to recogniZe common mterests and jointly 
create new public values. ld. at 1635-36. 
113. In addition, a consensus approach, in contrast to the 
formalistic or adversana1 approach of the "dominant federal" or 
"dual regulation· models, by encouraging examination of 
assumptions, mclus1ve thmking and a means for finding common 
ground among vanous mterests, prov1des the Jdeal environment 
m wh1ch to recogniZe different communities. Bates, supra note 16. 
sistency" or "layered federalism .. model found in the 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).114 Under 
this model, a state develops and administers a fed-
erally funded coastal resource management pro-
gram that meets uniform federal standards}l5 
Federal activities (both within and outside the pro-
gram area) must be consistent with the state's pro-
gram to the "maximum extent practicablen unless 
contrary to the national interest.l16Like the "collab-
orative management" model, the "layered federal-
ism" model has much to commend it. 
The historical experience underlying the "lay-
ered federalism" model, however. is significantly dif-
ferent from the public lands' experience; closer to 
that underlying the "dual regulation" model. The 
states' ability to manage coastal areas was consid-
ered supenor to that of the federal government, 
because the states already had the necessary 
resources, administrative machinery, enforcement 
powers, constitutional authority, and experience to 
do the job;117 historical predicates quite different 
from the states' experience on public domain 
lands.' IS Further, federal funds and the clear power 
shift to the states was perceived as a means to cor-
rect past distributional inequity in the coastal zone, 
where the nation as a whole had received the bene-
fits of coastal development and the impacted states 
bore all of the costs.J19 Perceived distributional 
mequities on public lands have historically been 
corrected or offset by federal funds, not by a redis-
tribution of power. 
While consistency between federal and state 
programs is not an unfamiliar concept in the public 
lands context, the public lands version is much 
weaker than that employed in the "layered federal-
Ism" model, more aspirational than controlling.J20 
Under the "layered federalism .. model, states can 
veto a proposed federal initiative that is inconsis-
tent with the state's program, giving the states con-
siderable leverage against the federal government. 
Under FLPl\1A, the federal planning process is mere-
114. 16 u.s.c. u 1451-04 (1994). 
115. For a recitation of those standards, see 16 U.S.C. § 
1455(d) (1994). 
I 16. 16 U.S.C. § 1456[c) (1994): Secretary of the lntenor v. 
california, 464 u.s. 312 (1934). 
I 17. Be';le, Sllpta note 25. According to Houck and Rolland. 
the CZMA "presumes· coastal land use Is pnmarily a state affau;. 
and proVIdes funding with only limited, programmatic federal 
re-Jiew of state performance Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at 
1289. 
I 18. Su S£1Pra note 4 I and accompanymg text. 
I I 9. Martin J. Lalonde. Note, Alkcaling Burazn of Prcaf !D 
E/ft41UJlt lf.t Pttsm'Jlbn and Fcdtralism Gears cf lf.t Ccastal Zane 
M1111agtll'.tnl A!t, 92 Mtot. J.. REv. 438 (1993). 
120. Leshy, s11pra note 25, at 109. 
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ly to be mformed by state and local concerns.l21 
BLM, not the states, makes the consistency finding 
and BLM can reJect a state or local standard, if the 
mterests of the federal government are not ade-
quately preserved by that standard. 122 Reservmg 
this authority m the federal government reflects 
congressional belief that the mtegrity of the govern-
mg federal laws and congressional policies should 
not be compromised by conflicting local con-
cerns,l23 a findirtg substantially at odds with the 
congressiOnal findings underlymg the "layered fed-
eralism" modeJ.l24 
Although the "layered federalism" model 
sounds similar m some respects to the "dual regu-
lation" model, there are significant differences of 
particular relevance to this analysis. The "layered 
federalism" model Is more truly a state-lead design 
than the "dual regulation" model. The model envi-
sions a strong role for state and local governments 
m the program area. The state admm1sters its 
coastal zone program without federal mtrus1on or 
even participation.l25 Although states must cons1d-
121.43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994) ("(Tihe Secretary shall. to 
the extent he finds practical, keep appnsed of State, local, and 
tribal land use plans."). Congress mtended, among other thmgs, 
for FLPMA to mcrease the opportunities for state and local gov-
ernments as well as the general public to partiopate m land man-
agement dec1s1ons. The Public Land Law Rev1ew CommiSSion, 
whose recommendations contributed to much of the content of 
FLPMA, noted many reasons for mcreasmg the role of state and 
local governments m the public land dec1s1on making process, 
mcluding the need to allow for more effective resolution of prob-
lems such as depressed local tax revenues due to property tax 
1mmunity of federal lands and zomng and pollution control prob-
lems on non-federal lands caused by uses of contiguous federal 
lands. For a further discussion of th1s and other related pomts, 
see Beyle, supra note 25, at 216. 
122. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (1994) (land use plans shall be 
consistent with state and local plans to the max1mum extent the 
Secretary finds consistent with federal law and the purposes of 
the Act). See also Beyle, supra note 25, at 216. Under the CZMA, 
state or local authorities determme the cons1stency of federal 
programs with state coastal zone management plans. 16 U.S.C. § 
1456(c) (1994). 
123. Beyle, supra note 25, at 222 n.l16 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 
1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 ( 1976)). Beyle writes of the contra-
dictory desue of Congress to bnng states and local governments 
mto the federal land management process more wh1ch was tem-
pered by an even stronger desue that federal pnmacy and control 
over public lands was still considered essential g1ven the prevail-
mg state record on management of the1r own lands. 1d. at 216-17. 
124. A key to more effective protection and use of the land 
and water resources of the coastal zone 1s to encourage states to 
exercise the1r full authority over the lands and waters m the 
coastal zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(1) (1994). Because ofthe1rprox1m-
ity to and reliance upon the coast and its resources, the coastal 
states have substantial and Significant mterests m the protec-
tion, management, and development of the resources of the 
exclus1ve economic zone that can only be served by the active 
partiopatlon of coastal states m all federal programs affecting 
such resources.Jd. § 1451(m). 
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er federal mterests m their mdiv1dual draft plans 
and conform to national critena, they are largely left 
free to develop and admm1ster their programs with· 
out the federal government second-guessing 
them.l26 And, while the federal government can 
restnct or condition federal fundingl27 and withdraw 
plan approvaJ.128 JUSt like it can m the "dual regula· 
tion" model, federal oversight of state performance 
under this model Is considerably Jess objectionable 
to the states, because the traditional federal"sticks" 
of the "dual regulation" model are substantially off· 
set m the "layered federalism" model by the federal 
COnSIStency prOVISIOn.l29 
Further, smce local concerns are elevated under 
the model as a result of states bemg encouraged to 
tailor their plans to meet local needs,131) the federal 
consistency model. like the collaborative manage· 
ment model, should also produce a product that Is 
sensitive to these needs, and, therefore, supported 
by the local communities. Thus, the fnction mherent 
m the "dual regulation" model's heavy reliance on 
federal oversight to achieve des1red state perfor· 
125. In contrast, under CWA § 402(d) each state with dele· 
gated authority to admm1ster the national pollution discharge 
elimmation system permit program must submit to EPA a copy of 
each permit application rece1ved by the state. 33 U.S.C. § l342(d) 
(1994). The state cannot 1ssue a permit until QQ days have passed 
without EPA noting its obJection to the permit. 
126. The Secretary of Commerce cannot approve any state 
management plan unless the v1ews of federal agencies principal· 
ly affected by the plan have been adequately considered, 16 
U.S.C. § 1456(a) ( 1994), the plan provides for adequate consider• 
ation of national mterests Involved In siting of energy facilities 
wh1ch are of greater than local Significance, /d.§ 1455(d)(8), and 
lands wh1ch are held m trust by or subJect solely to the discretion 
of the federal government are excluded from the definition of 
"coastal zone; 1d. § 1453(1). See Beyle, supra note 25, at 211-12. 
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c) (1994) (suspension of federal assls· 
tance if coastal state failing to adhere to management program or 
grant terms). 
128. ld. § 1458(d) (approval shall be withdrawn If coastal 
state fails to cure defects m its compliance with its management 
program or grant terms). 
129. State program authority to condition or reject outright 
certain types of federal and federally-supported development has 
been upheld agamst cla1ms of preemption and Interference with 
mterstate commerce. Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at 1297. Su 
also Michael A. Wolf, Accommodating Tensions In lne Coastal Zont. An 
Jnlroduclion and Ovetvltw, 25 NAT. RESOURCES L,J, 7 ( 1985), 
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1994). Another example of the 
extent to wh1ch the coastal zone management program is, at 
least, structured to be sensitive to local concerns can be found In 
§ 306(d}(2)(BJ m wh1ch states are enJoined not only to establish 
an "effective mechamsm" for continuing consultation with local 
governments to assure their full participation In Implementing 
the state's coastal zone management program, but the mecha• 
msms themselves must prov1de for an opportunity for comment 
by local governments m any situation where Implementation of 
any management program dec1s1on would conflict with any local 
zonmg ordinance. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)(BJ ( 1994). 
Winter 1996 
mance is not a significant factor m the "layered fed-
eralism" modeJ.t3t In fact, critiasms of the program 
have less to do with its governance model than its 
limited financtal resources and overly broad scope.t32 
The reduction m federalism tensions, however, 
IS not without cost. A state-lead program without 
clear national standards and federal overstght, fea-
tures of the "dual regulation" model can create sub-
stantial differences and mequities among the states 
and be an mvitation to mdustry forum shoppmg. m 
By allowmg each state unfettered authority to 
"resolve for its own coastal area baste choices 
among competing uses for finite resources,"l34 no 
particular result m favor of any resource can be 
assured, )eopardizmg the achtevement of national 
norms favonng protection of those resources.m 
The "layered federalism" model's effectiveness 
at controlling coastal development and limiting 
environmental damage, just like the "dommant fed-
eral model,'' depends on coordination between the 
vanous layers of government as well as among agen-
cies withm each layer.t36 Yet, the consistency mech-
amsm can be its own cause of conflict between the 
vanous layers of government despite the fact its use 
should tngger intra-state JUrisdictional negotiations 
and offer a way to elimmate mconststent regulatory 
reqUirements among the different JUrisdictions with-
m a state.m Expenence with the model reveals that 
the different layers of government operate indepen-
131. SuperviSion of state performance and enforcement of 
the Act by the federal government,. although of a continuing 
nature and comprehensive m scope, generally leads only to non· 
bmding suggestions for state program Improvement Mandatory 
recommendations; according to Houck and Rolland, are restrict· 
ed to process-onented Improvements. The Secretarys only over-
Sight stick IS to suspend federal funding, If a state fails to adhere 
to an approved program, and then only after an elaborate 
process, wh1ch, a gam according to Houck and Rolland, serves as 
both a sh1eld agamst federal attempts to de-fund aggressive state 
programs and agamst complamts of program VIolations in favor 
of development mterests. The CZMA prov1des no pnvate federal 
cause of action agamst states, local governments or pnvate par-
ties cla1med to be m v1olation of state coastal management pro-
grams, therefore. dtizen overs1ght over state program perfor-
mance IS limited as well. See generally Houck & Rolland, supra note 
54. at 1294-99. 
132. See Richard Hildreth & Ralph W. Johnson, CZM In 
Cali[orma, Oregon, and Washington, 25 NAT. REsoURCES). 103 (1985) 
(program's broad scope and federal resource limitations threaten 
to enervate program or tum it mto a one-1ssue program). 
133. Inequities are also created among applicants as a result 
of the enhancement of the states' powers and the dominance of 
state and local concerns over national concerns. The states' abili-
ty to 1m pose more stnngent reqmrements can cause non-uniform 
changes m regulatory burdens 1mposed on applicants by federal 
laws, regulatory differences between coastal and non-coastal 
states. and h1gher transaction costs. Scott C. Whitney et al., State 
Implementation of the Coastal Zone Managemenl ConsiStency 
ProvlSJonrllltra Vires or Unconstitutional?, 12 HAAv. EtMt.. L. REv. 67 
I 1988): cf. Beyle, supra note 25, at 214 (expenence has shown CZMA 
dispute resolution mechamsm and the scheme of shared federal· 
dently of each other, with "tunnel vision" and a 
myopic sense of territoriality.m This behavior can 
result in duplicate programs, programmatic conflict, 
turf wars, and less environmental protection, sound-
ing remarkably like the experience under both the 
"dominant federal" and "dual regulation" models.m 
However. these problems are experienced most 
keenly at the state and local level. State-local ten-
stons replace the federal-state tensions of the "dom-
inant federal" and "dual regulation" models, turning 
the model into a battleground for conflicting 
philosophies over the distribution of power between 
state and local governments.'4" 
Although, the "layered federalism" model is lim-
ited by state boundaries, like the "dominant federal" 
and "dual regulation" models, the model holds 
somewhat more promise for achieving rational 
ecosystem management than might be expected. 
The power to find parochial federal programs incon-
sistent with broader state natural resource goals and 
the Importance of local concerns create an opportu-
nity for making rational ecosystem decisions in an 
ecologically defined area within a state.'4' In addi-
tion, the planning approach underlying the "layered 
federalism" model. as it underlies the "collaborative 
management" model, and the absence of binding, 
uniform standards, a feature of the "dual regulation" 
model, allows for state experimentation and innova-
tion,142 and for conservation biology's adaptive man-
state control have acted to inhibit such strategic behaVIor). 
134. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225. 
1247 (D. Del. 1986). 
135. Houck& Rolland, supra note 54. at 1299. 
136. Ronald J. Rychlak. Ccztal Zane Managzment and tli! Searcft 
{or lnttgrallan. 40 DtPAIIL L. REv. 981 (1991 ). 
137. For a discussion of the dispute resolution mechamsrns 
In the Coastal Zone Management Act. see Be-;le.supra note 25. at 
212-14. 
138. Rychlak. supra note 136, at 995. S!t also Whitney et al., 
supra note 133 (pro11!ding another highly critical vie-vi of the fed· 
era I consistency pro'Jislon). 
139. R~·chlak. supra note 136. at 996. 
140. Rychlak. supra note 136. While there IS some reason to 
expect that the same dynamic might happen in the ·collaborative 
management" model v.ith local jurisdictions vying for power with 
their states, the presence of non-go'Jernmental partiopants m 
the planning process and the federal government as a fadlitator 
may act to lessen the likelihood df this happemng tn that model. 
141. This feature of the "layered federalism· model can be a 
double edged sword with respect to protecting natural resources 
of nationally recognized value like wetlands. as states can use 
this authority to stop ell'llronmentally protective federal actions 
as well as destructive ones. 
142. Houck and Rolland emphasize the •pliable" nature of 
not only the federal standards governing approval of state coastal 
programs, but also In how states structure their management 
programs and define the extent of their coastal JUnsdiction. 
Houck & Rolland, supra note 54, at 1294-95. 
207 
~-
• 
= ~ z 
0 ; 
! 
= 
Hope M. Babcock 
agement pnnctples to be applied.t43 
The model ts less mclustve of diverse public 
votces than mtght be anticipated from its emphasts 
on plannmg. Broad public participation ts mvited m 
state plan formulation1 44 and state plans must 
mclude procedures for public participation m the 
permitting process as well as consistency determt-
nations.145 However, once the plants approved, the 
process becomes less mviting and mclustve and 
more hterarchtcal and formal. replicating the barn-
ers to participation by divers public communities 
found m the "dual regulation" model.l46 
Although the htstoncal predicates behmd the 
federal consistency or "layered federalism" model 
are less compelling when applied to the public 
domam lands than the "collaborative management" 
model, the "layered federalism" model does offer 
some benefits. The model appears to reduce feder-
al-state tenstons, although, m practtce, it may 
merely transfer those tens tons down a layer to state 
and local governments. The model also offers some 
potential for rattonal ecosystem management with-
In a state and diversification of public parttctpation 
m the dectstonmakmg process. The model. however, 
may cause htgh transaction costs for thtrd parties, 
and does not assure the fulfillment of national 
norms with respect to protection of natural 
resources or prevent distributional mequities from 
occurnng among the several states. 
IV. Conclusion 
Thts discusston should make clear that no sm-
gle model discussed m thts article offers a complete 
panacea to the federalism tenstons, ecosystem 
management Irrationality and lack of community 
mclustvity afflictmg public lands management 
today as a result of the application of the "dommant 
federal" model. The least curative approach, and 
thus the least appealing substitute for the current 
paradigm, ts that offered by the "dual regulation" 
model. Expenence with the first model reveals that 
its theoretical promtses are largely chtmencal. 
The "collaborative management" and "layered 
federalism" models, on the other hand, do offer 
some advancements over the "dommant federal" 
model. Enhanced state roles under these models 
have led to a lessemng of federal tenstons as well as 
143. According to critics of the "layered federalism" model. 
the ad hoc, fragmented dec1s1onmakmg approach fostered by the 
model IS the antithesis of rational ecosystem dec1s1onmakmg. 
Oliver A. Houck, Ending t~e War: A Strategy to Save Amenca's Coastal 
Zone, 47 Mo. L. REV. 358, 361 1 1988). See also Rychlak, supra note 
136, at 994-99. 
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(4) (1994) (state must hold public 
heanngs m development of management plan). 
208 
VollX!le 3, Number 2 
a greater opportunity for rational ecosystem man· 
agement and more mclustve dectstonmakmg. At the 
same time, application of these more cooperative 
models of governance may make more problematic 
the achtevement of national norms and, at least with 
regard to the "layered federalism" model. the avoid· 
ance of distributional mequities. Therefore, none of 
these models warrants wholesale relocation to pub· 
lie domam lands without careful weighing of what is 
gamed and lost m the substitution process. 
If changes to the current public lands gover· 
nance model are gomg to be made, however, it may 
be more Important to resolve the ecosystem man· 
agement and public participation problems of the 
"dommant federal" model than its federalism ten· 
stons. Fnction m our federal system of government 
has been m extstence smce the formation of the 
republic. The mere fact that these tenstons exist at 
all on public lands, where there ts no mstitutlonal 
role for either state or local governments, is a testa· 
ment to the endemtc and perststent nature of the 
problem under our system of government. 
Exammation of the three federalism models shows, 
at most, a lessenmg of these tenstons, but not their 
complete disappearance. To hope for more, in the 
case of public domam lands, therefore, may be to 
hope for too much. 
The same cannot be satd, however, with respect 
to overcommg the political and mstitutional barr!· 
ers preventing rational ecosystem management and 
democratic dectstonmakmg on public domain 
lands. Unless these problems can be solved, the 
btologtcal and soctal communities that depend 
upon those lands will wither and die. Therefore, fea· 
tures of the three models exammed m thts article 
that remove these barners should be looked at serl· 
ously m the redestgn process, even if the models' 
other attributes are not so prom1smg. 
145.1d. § 1455(d)(l4). 
146. For a descnption of the dispute resolution mechanisms 
of the CZMA showmg both the formalism of those mechanisms 
as well as the1r effectiveness at averting conflict and delay, see 
Beyle. supra note 25, at 212-16. For a contrary view of the provl· 
s1on's connict avo1dance effectiveness, see Whitney et al., supra 
note 133. 
